ABSTRACT: The nature of our obligation to obey the law has consistently been an important object of philosophical dispute. Fair play based theo ries of obligation purport to show that it is unfair for us to benefit from an organizational scheme (such as the state) without contributing our fair share to the provision of goods. George Klosko is a major proponent of this approach. I develop his particular version of the argument from fair play into a defensible theory of citizens' obligation to obey the laws of their state.
In this paper, I will critically assess George Klosko's argum ent for the grounding of political obligations in the principle of fair play. In par ticular, I will inspect the validity of his argum ent for extending this obliga tion from schemes that provide only w hat he calls "presumptively ben eficial goods" to those that also offer "discretionarily beneficial goods."1 I will delineate how he explains obligations from fair play in the case of presum ptive goods, but I will assume the argument is sound. I will argue that Klosko's particular justification of political obligations is intuitively valid by addressing two possible objections, which I call the "multiplicity of schemes objection" and the "process of addition objection." As I will 1. George Klosko, "Presumptive Benefit, Fairness, and Political Obligation," The Duty to Obey the Law: Selected Philosophical Readings. ed. William A. Edmundson (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999): pp. 197-198. demonstrate, I believe the answer to the second objection obviates the first one, so that we may construct a theory of political obligation based on Klosko's position.
Klosko follows H.L.A. Hart and John Rawls in delineating a source of political obligation to a cooperative scheme grounded in the principle of fair play. In short, w hen we actively accept the benefits of the collaborative effort of a plurality of individuals, we may be obligated (to those individu als) to bear our fair share of the necessary w ork or costs. Klosko distin guishes between two types of goods that a scheme can offer: "excludable" goods can be provided to specific individuals and denied to others (such as electricity and water services); in contrast, "nonexcludable" goods can not be kept from specific others.2 Individuals cannot help but benefit from nonexcludable goods. For example, a state that concerns itself exclusively w ith national defense can be construed as a scheme that provides a single, nonexcludable good. While it is simple to apply the principle of fair play to cooperative schemes that provide excludable goods, as individuals m ust actively seek to become its participants in order to benefit from them, it is less clear w hen they supply nonexcludable goods. In the latter case, we m ust distinguish betw een one who actively seeks benefit and w hat Robert Nozick calls the "innocent bystander," who benefits from the goods offered despite her attempts to avoid them.3 This is where presum ptive goods become relevant to the argument.
According to Klosko, we can suppose by definition that everybody desires presum ptive goods regardless of whatever else they w ant from a coopera tive scheme. He argues that in the case of schemes providing presum p tive goods the importance of the benefits provided overrides the prospec tive participant's normal right to choose w hether she wishes to enter the scheme. tional defense whatever else lies in their interest. So even though we may not have accepted the benefit of national defense, the state (as a cooperative scheme) can assume that it is im portant enough that we all accept its provi sion. Klosko is thus able to avert a problem plaguing the idea of obligation to schemes that provide nonexcludable goods. We can now complete the definition of a cooperative scheme which, according to him, w ould bind everyone to participate from the principle of fair play. This scheme m ust provide nonexcludable benefits that are (i) w orth their costs to the recipi ents, (ii) presumptively beneficial,5 and (iii) balanced justly w ith burdens and distributed fairly w ithin the scheme.6 This is the explanation that I accept as sound for the sake of argument. The discussion becomes more complex w hen considering discretionary goods, because the argum ent of importance does not apply.
Klosko rightly notes that an obligation to schemes providing pre sumptive goods is not sufficient to describe political obligations, since gov ernments offer a m yriad of goods that do not fit this definition. Imagine a state that endeavored only to defend its territory from external invasion.
As noted above, this w ould be a scheme that provides a nonexcludable presum ptive good, but it is philosophically uninteresting since it does not in the least correspond to m odern states. M odern states (for the most part) provide w hat Klosko calls discretionary goods, which may be desirable but "should not be viewed as essential to people's well-being."7 How can an obligation from fair play to participate in schemes that produce pre sumptive goods be extended to those that offer discretionary goods? In my example, Klosko has explained why we may be obligated to states that ensure border patrol, but not why we should pay taxes for public schools.
Klosko argues for such an extension. He seeks to extend the func tion of cooperative schemes that already produce presum ptive goods to 5. Ibid., 197. 6. Ibid., 203. 7. Ibid., 198. include discretionary goods. The idea is that there is a difference between dem anding cooperation for a scheme that provides both presum ptive and discretionary goods and requiring additional contributions of an individ ual to a scheme that already obliges him.8 Thus, individual A has a prima facie obligation to cooperate w ith a scheme providing presumptively ben eficial goods that, afterwards, begins to offer discretionary goods as well.
In my example, citizens who are already obliged to contribute to the costs of national defense may, in a second moment, also incur an obligation to pay taxes for public education. In this case, Klosko writes, it is up to A to show that, once the scheme has assumed the provision of discretionary goods in addition to the initial presum ptive ones, it no longer satisfies, as a whole, the criteria required for fair play-based obligation. So scheme X that provides presum ptive goods and discretionary goods a, b, and c must be shown by A herself to be (i) overly costly or (iii) unfair to A in order for her to justifiably deny her contribution.9
For the remainder of the paper, I will focus on two pivotal criti cisms of this argument. The first one, what I have called the "multiplicity of schemes objection," attacks the notion of benefit packages implicit in Klosko's argument. Klosko seems to imply that w hen members of a scheme decide to take on additional forms of cooperation, they are incrementing the package of benefits that the schemes in which they participate provide, but perhaps this is not the correct way to think about it. Maybe the result of assuming new forms of cooperation is a division into multiple schemes w ith one providing the original presum ptive good and the others offering new discretionary goods. This means individual A w ould be free to sub scribe to the former scheme (e.g. defense of the borders) w ithout being a member of the latter ones (e.g. public education). Klosko could rebut since the cooperative members that provide the presum ptive and discretionary goods are identical, it w ould not make sense to say that there are two dif-8. Ibid., 205. 9. Ibid., 206. ferent schemes. But this is not implausible: a credit card company, for ex ample, offers very distinct benefits to its more longstanding (or wealthy) members than it does to regular customers.
Thus, we have a problem. How can we tie the additional discretion ary goods Klosko writes about to the original presum ptive good in such a way that they can collectively be considered part of the same "package of benefits?" We could undertake to demonstrate that the provision of na tional defense depends necessarily on the concomitant offering of goods such as public education. However, the m anner in which Klosko frames his argum ent seems to preclude such an approach. The presum ptive goods are chronologically prior to the discretionary ones. A more tenable m ethod becomes apparent w hen we consider the process by which members of a scheme should decide to cooperate in the provision of additional discre tionary goods, which takes us to the second objection to the overall argu ment.
The second counterargument, which I called the "process of ad dition objection," asks the question of how the members of a cooperative scheme are to decide which discretionary benefits the scheme should pro vide in addition to the presum ptive ones. Consider state X that provides its citizens only w ith the presum ptive goods of national defense and physi cal security. According to Klosko's position, the functionaries of this state could be justified in adding any task to their office so long as the sum-total of the goods provided met the three conditions necessary to generate obli gation, even if they may be individually detrimental. Suppose state X now decreed that all citizens m ust be subject to forced labor for three hours ev ery day. The overall scheme (assuming it is still a single one) may very well meet Klosko's three criteria, but some of the collaborative "goods" now provided are not beneficial at all. So the extension of obligation requires a legitimate process of addition of collaborative ventures at the least.
In what manner, then, should members of a scheme elect to take on the provision of particular discretionary goods? It appears to me that the most tenable m ethod w ould include a democratic process: the members of the scheme should vote upon which discretionary goods to collaboratively provide. Being an insider to a collaborative scheme gives individuals many stakes in the scheme itself; it w ould be unfair for any insiders not to have a voice regarding the direction in which their scheme is being lead. Thus, the principle of fairness w ould apply not only to the distribution of goods but also to the process whereby it is decided which discretionary goods a scheme is to provide. By my position, if we live in a state that provides only national defense, we can subsequently convene in the tow n hall and choose democratically w hat else we w ould like the state (as a scheme) to do for us. Notice that we now think of the goods as a single package of benefits: the "multiplicity of schemes" argument loses impetus. This pro cess of addition w ould also ensure that no detrimental "goods" be added to the scheme as in the forced labor example, thus countering the second objection. In my view, then, a democratic process of addition is necessary for fair-play-based obligation.
There are counterarguments to my view in favor of incorporating democratic standards in collaborative schemes to save the principle of fair play, but I hope to dismiss them. In the first place, it m ight be said that the collaborative scheme becomes susceptible to the problematic situation of the tyranny of the majority. If a consistent and unchanging majority sys tematically votes against the minority, the objection follows that the m i nority is in a de facto state of subjection to power. However, I believe the intuitive force of the counterargument is misplaced in this context: added discretionary benefits m ust each be w orth their costs to their recipients.
The objection loses considerable force once this is remembered: a peren nial minority w ould not be disrespected or exploited, because it would actually benefit from the ordinances of the majority, just not in the way it envisioned.
The second objection grants that incorporating a democratic ideal into the process of addition of discretionary benefits w ould constitute suf ficient grounds for political obligation. However, it seems that we are now merely supplem enting the principle of fair play w ith another source of ob ligation, as opposed to extending its influence. If we accept this counter argument, we w ould have to adm it that fair play fails to generate political obligation on its own, and m ust be buttressed by another theory. I believe we can surpass this conceptual hurdle by writing the fair process of addi tion into the very conditions a scheme m ust satisfy in order to generate po litical obligation. Thus, we could add a fourth (iv) criterion: there m ust be a fair m ethod of decision regarding which discretionary benefits to add to the scheme. Notice that though this is a slight modification of the reasons why we are bound to schemes by a principle of fair play, it is not a source of obligation independent of fair play. We are not obliged to schemes be cause we have a right to vote, but because in certain conditions (the vote being one of them) conducive to the generation of nonexcludable benefits, it w ould be unfair of us not to do our part for the scheme providing those benefits.
In conclusion, we can ascertain that Klosko's extension of fair play obligation from schemes providing presum ptive goods to those that ad ditionally offer discretionary goods is intuitively justified. However, his argument encounters several difficulties that somewhat m utate its prem ises and conclusions. Klosko is mistaken, for example, in thinking that the three conditions required for the generation of fair play obligation apply only to schemes as a whole. I have shown that it is more plausible to think they are applicable also to the individual benefits themselves. Along with the addition of the democratic ideal condition, this is the only possible way to make the assumption that schemes provide a package of benefits rather than considering each good as produced by a distinct scheme. Finally, we can circumvent the criticism that the argument no longer resembles one of fair play if we write the voting practice for the addition of discretion ary goods into the initial conditions required for the generation of political obligation. In sum, we may be politically obliged to a scheme that satisfies these four criteria: (i) it provides benefits that are w orth their costs to their recipients, (ii) at least one of these benefits is presum ptively beneficial, (iii) the burdens and benefits are distributed fairly w ithin it, and (iv) the discre tionary benefits provided are fairly decided upon. V
